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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the circuit court was established pursuant to § 78-4-7 Utah Code 
Ann., and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The jurisdiction of this Court is established pursuant to 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
(Respecting Both Parts of This Two-Part Appeal - (Part A and Part B)) 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby 
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth 
amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah? 
(Respecting Part A) 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where 
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(c), 
U.R.C.P., the affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claims were stale and thus barred by the 
doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel? 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection under 
the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to Assignor's 
contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts pursuant to her 
unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted, in order to obtain 
an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiffs claims as provided pursuant to Rule 
13(c), U.R.C.P.? 
ISSUE NO, 4: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it 
calculated Plaintiffs claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's unproven 
amounts in light of finding that Plaintiffs case suffered from lack of adequate evidence in 
the record? 
(Respecting Part B) 
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the circuit cottrt err by finding that Defendant had failed to prove, 
"by a preponderance of the evidence," that she had a cause of action pursuant to the 
FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims thereunder 
as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial? 
STATEMENT OF IHE CASE 
This case arises from events commencing in early 1982 when Plaintiffs Assignor 
("Assignor" or "Creditor") defaulted on an equipment purchase contract with Defendant 
("Defendant's Contract"). Thereafter, Defendant offered to trade amounts in default for 
dental services in lieu of payment by Assignor and a verbal agreement was struck. During 
Defendant's treatment more extensive procedures were required which necessitated direct 
negotiations between Assignor and Defendant's insurance carrier. These entities, upon 
completion of negotiations, represented to Defendant that they "had agreed" as to the 
estimated costs of treatment but neither entity disclosed the substance of these negotiations 
to Defendant then or thereafter. Defendant's dental treatment was completed in 1984 and 
Assignor submitted a statement for the purported balance due. Assignor's statement failed 
to reflect credit for the prior default amounts and numerous insurance benefit payments. 
Thereupon a dispute arose between the Parties. In 1991, Assignor assigned the purported 
balance due to Plaintiff, a third-party collection agency, to effect collection thereof. During 
the course of collection attempts, Plaintiff committed various acts which Defendant asserts 
to be in violation of both the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq,, 
and the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act § 13-11-1 et seq,, Utah Code Ann. Plaintiff 
instituted this action in 1992. Defendant originally answered proper and denied Plaintiffs 
allegations. Thereafter, Defendant retained counsel and obtained leave to file an amended 
answer and add a counterclaim. After various motions and two pretrial conferences, trial 
B R I E F O F A P P F I I AKIT - PArsF s> 
was held in December 1994 and judgment was rendered for Plaintiff. Defendant objected 
to Plaintiffs post-trial submission of findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment 
on the grounds of manifest error. 
On 5 May 1995, another hearing was held in an attempt to resolve this post-trial 
dispute, whereupon a final Order was entered reflecting the provisions of revised findings 
and conclusions. From that Judgment this two-part appeal is now taken. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts set forth in Part A of this appeal deal solely with matters regarding the 
claims in Plaintiffs complaint and Defendant's defenses and counterclaims thereto. Part 
B hereof deals with the subject matter of Defendant's counterclaim which seeks relief for 
Plaintiffs alleged violations of the FDCPA which, in turn, give rise to additional pendent 
claims under the UCSPA. Although the claims under both Part A and Part B necessarily 
arise from the same disputed transactions, the two Parts bear no logical relationship to each 
other.1 With respect to Part A, the facts date from Assignor's default on Defendant's 
Contract for postage and mailing equipment, executed 31 March 1982, and subsequent 
events related thereto. These events eventually culminated in Assignor's assigning to 
Plaintiff the alleged debt purported to be owed by Defendant and ultimately resulted in 
the instant litigation now on appeal here. With respect to Part B, the facts stem from 
Plaintiffs initial communication to Defendant, dated 8 May 1991, as a third-party debt 
collector, and events transpiring thereafter, all of which Defendant alleges violated the 
1
 See Peterson v. United Accounts, Inc., 638 F.2d 1134,1137 (8th Cir., 1981) (While the 
debt claim and the FDCPA counterclaim raised here may, in a technical sense, arise from 
the same...transaction, the two claims bear no logical relation to one another. Although 
there is some overlap of issues raised in both cases as a result of the defenses raised in the 
state action, the suit on the debt brought in state court is not logically related to the federal 
action initiated to enforce federal policy regulating the practices for the collection of such 
debts). 
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FDCPA and give rise to the additional protections afforded pursuant to the UCSPA. This 
two-part appeal raises five (5) principal issues for review by this Court. The first issue 
relates to both Part A and Part B. Issues #2 through #4, inclusive, relate to Part A only, 
while Issue #5 relates solely to Part B. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby 
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth 
amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah? This question presents a conclusion of law which the Court of Appeals 
reviews for correctness. United Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P. 2d 880, 885 
(Utah, 1993); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah, 1993); 
McMahan v. Bees, 873 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994); Wade v. Stangl 869 P.2d 9,12 
(Ut.Ct.App., 1994). Appellate courts have the ultimate power to conduct an independent 
review of federal constitutional claims. City of St George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932 
(Utah, 1993) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 
[1973]). 
RESPECTING PART A 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where 
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(c) 
U.R.C.P., the affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claims were stale and thus barred by the 
doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel? This issue, likewise, presents a conclusion of law 
which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994); Provo River Water Users'Ass'n. v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993); Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); Klinger v. Kightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 870 
(Utah 1990); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Sew v. Security Title 
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Co, 857 P.2d 958, 961 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993), cert, granted, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). This 
standard has also been referred to as a "correction of error standard." Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. 
State Tax Common., 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134,1135 
(Utah 1992); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993). 
With regard to the issue of laches, see Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256,1260 (Utah 1975). Cited in Leaver v. Grose, 610 
P.2d 1262,1264, n. 2 (Utah 1980); Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Division of State Lands 
and Forestry, et at, 802 P.2d 720,731 (Utah 1990); Sandy City v. SaltLake County, 827 P.2d 
227, 230, n. 5 (Utah 1992). 
ISSUE NCX 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection under 
the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to Assignor's 
contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts pursuant to her 
unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted, in order to obtain 
an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiffs claims as provided pursuant to Rule 
13(c), U.R.C.P.? This issue presents a conclusion of law and is reviewable by the Court of 
Appeals for correctness as cited in the authorities in Issues No. 1 and 3, above. For 
authorities deciding whether the court properly interpreted an unambiguous contact, see: 
Saunders v.Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199-200 (Utah 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut Ins. 
Group, 868 P.2d 110,112 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994); Edwards &Daniels Architects, Inc. v. Farmers9 
Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993); LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 
P.2d 189, 192 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it 
calculated Plaintiffs claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's unproven 
amounts in light of finding that Plaintiffs case suffered from lack of adequate evidence in 
the record? This issue presents a conclusion of law and is reviewable by the Court of 
Appeals for correction of the court's calculations as cited in the authorities set forth in 
Issues No. 1 and 3, above. 
RESPECTING PART B 
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the circuit court err by finding that Defendant had failed to prove, 
,fby a preponderance of the evidence/' that she had a cause of action pursuant to the 
FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims thereunder 
as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial? This issue presents a 
question of fact which is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. See Western 
Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Ut.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989) (Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the appellant can show that they are 
without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view of 
the law); Maughnv.Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 
P.2d 1022 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989); Butler v. 
Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989) (Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be 
shown that they are against the clear weight of evidence or that they induce a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made). Whether a statute applies to a particular 
set of facts is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Waite, 803 P.2d 
1279, 1282 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The First Issue presented herein relates to the entirety of both Part A and Part B of 
this two-part appeal. It presents a substantive due process question which arises from the 
circuit court's untimely restriction placed upon the time for trial, which restriction 
Defendant argues precluded her from her rightful day in court, thus operating to prohibit 
her from fully prosecuting her defenses and counterclaims. Issues two through four, 
inclusive, deal solely with questions arising under Part A regarding the subject matter of 
Plaintiffs complaint while under Part B the fifth issue deals with Defendant's 
counterclaims under the FDCPA and UCSPA. The Second Issue in this appeal presents 
the question of whether Plaintiffs claims were barred by laches owing to Assignor's lack 
of diligence in prosecuting its alleged claims and the subsequent loss of relevant evidence 
resulting from the inordinate lapse of time and inadequate record-keeping, rendering such 
evidence unavailable, together with unavailability of a material witness having first-hand 
knowledge of the facts from the outset, and argues that this affirmative defense is 
preserved on appeal where it is contained in Defendants's amended answer and 
counterclaim pleadings. The Third Issue presents the question of whether the circuit court 
erred in granting judgment in favor of Plaintiff where it relied upon clearly erroneous 
amounts contained in billing statements previously mailed to Defendant by Assignor, 
thereby determining, as the basis for its calculations, an amount exceeding the relief sought 
in Plaintiffs complaint by more than $1,350.00. The Fourth Issue presents the question of 
whether the circuit court erred by denying Defendant equal protection pursuant to the 
express terms of her contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted, and argues 
on appeal that the court erred by excluding Defendant's contract from being published and 
that Defendant was thereby precluded from the benefit of interest due thereunder in 
calculating her offset against Plaintiffs claims while Plaintiff was awarded interest 
pursuant to its contract with Defendant — both contracts providing for equal rates of 
interest. Lastly, the Fifth Issue, pursuant to Part B, presents the question of whether the 
circuit court erred by summarily concluding, as a matter of law, that Defendant had failed 
to meet her burden of proof "by a preponderance of the evidence" establishing that she had 
a cause of action pursuant to the FDCPA and the UCSPA in light of the fact that the 
untimely restriction of time for trial effectively precluded her from fully prosecuting her 
claims through direct examination of witnesses on such issues, and argues that the court's 
request for Counsel to simply provide it with a cursory "Reader's Digest" version of the 
substantive matter thereof manifestly violated the letter and spirit of clear congressional 
and state legislative intent under both Acts as established by well settled decisional law. 
ARGUMENT 
(Respecting Both Part A and Part B) 
ISSUE #1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby 
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth 
amendment to the U. SL Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah? 
At two (2) pretrial conferences held during the protracted litigation of this case,2 and 
on no less than six (6) separate instances thereat the court below plainly stated that the 
Parties would be allowed a half-day for trial, or reasonably thereabout, to try the issues in 
controversy. Addressing Defendant's counsel in this regard, the court first stated as 
follows: 
"I'm going to indicate to you that Pm going to give your client absolutely 
the day in court to which any litigant is entitled." (P.T., 10 Dec. 1993, page 
5, lines 10-12.)3 
Later in this pretrial conference the court again stated: 
"This is the kind of case that really should take no longer than a half a day." 
(P.T., at p. 13, lines 12-13. Ibid.) 
And finally, the court concluded by expressing its willingness to accommodate the Parties' 
respective schedules and, inquiring as to the fairness of its detemiination in this regard, 
stated as follows: 
"Now please understand when I said 111 accommodate your schedule, I go 
to Summit County and handle two courts up there. I am also locked into 
circuit prelim dates and generally I have to get filed — generally a Friday, 
2
 Respectively, on 10 December 1993, and 28 October 1994. 
3
 Pretrial Conference Transcript. Herein, citations to Pretrial Conference Transcripts 
are denoted as "P.T.," followed by the hearing date with appropriate citation to the page 
and line numbers. Similarly, citations to Reporter's Trial Transcript are denoted as "R.T." 
maybe a Tuesday, I could get in but we are very current in this court and I'm 
not going to delay the resolution of this case. As soon as you tell me it's 
ready, within a matter of weeks you can have a half-day trial setting. Does 
that sound fair?" (P.T., at p. 15, lines 13-20. Id.) 
At the second pretrial conference held more than ten (10) months later, the court 
continued this line of reasoning wherein it gave cognizance to the efforts thus far expended 
in the matter and again stated as follows: 
"I wonder — you obviously have both put in an extended amount of work 
in trying to get this case either brought to trial or not. And I certainly want 
to give you what time you want to present those arguments. I wonder if it 
might be more fair to both of you to just allow me to call the rest of the 
calender (sic) and see what we can get resolved and I would not have to rush 
it through." (P.T., 28 October 1994, p. 3, lines 14-20. Ibid.) 
Upon setting the trial date, the court then stated: 
"Let's set this [for] 1:30 on December 16th. I'm going to allow that afternoon 
a half day trial setting. Ill not set other matters, let you start right at 1:30 on 
Friday, December 16th." (P.T., at p. 5, lines 13-16. Id.) 
And concluding, stated again: 
"...- - [tjhat will give us a realistic chance to get this done in a half day. ... 
If you were to exchange that [list] by December 1st, and you have a first 
place trial setting for Friday, December 16th at 1:30." (P.T., at p. 6, lines 19-
20, and p. 7, lines 2-4, respectively. Id.) 
Thus, for more than a year in accordance with the aforesaid pronouncements — 
notwithstanding the longevity of the facts in this case extending back more than a dozen 
years — Defendant justifiably and reasonably relied upon the expectation that she was 
going to be afforded a half-day for trial, or reasonably thereabout, to fully argue her 
defenses to Plaintiffs claims and to prosecute her counterclaim allegations. Indeed, the 
right to resort to the courts in order to obtain both procedural and substantive due process 
is a fundamental right that has been guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Utah 
since its adoption and ratification in 1896. Art. I, § 11, thereof provides as follows: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
Citing this constitutional provision, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
"The right to resort to the courts for the adjudication of grievances and the 
settlement of disputes is a fundamental and important one." LeGrand 
Johnson v. Peterson, 420 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah, 1966). See also, Barnhart v. 
Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., 398 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah, 1965). Ibid. 
Notwithstanding the long-anticipated time for trial however, on the very day of trial, 
within mere hours of the scheduled time, Defendant was notified by the court that a one 
(1) hour time restriction had been imposed in which to try the case. Defendant, in 
reasonable reliance upon the trial court's prior statements in this regard, had allocated 
roughly 1-1/2 hours each, more or less, in which to (i) argue and defend against Plaintiffs 
claims, as set forth in Part A of her pleadings, and (ii) to prosecute her counterclaim 
allegations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA"), as set forth in Part B thereof. Having thus been untimely 
restricted as aforesaid, Defendant was deprived of the essential elements of substantive and 
procedural due process and, as the proximate result thereof, suffered undue harm and 
prejudice. 
It is axiomatic that "due process" literally means "the process that is due," or, as 
legally defined: "Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice."4 It 
is equally well-settled that an essential element of that process is the right to be heard, or, 
one's right to his or her day in court. See, for example, State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 830 
(Ut.Ct.App., 1992) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Each person is entitled to his or her day in 
court"). Indeed, due process is a fundamental guarantee under the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the U. S. Constitution as well as Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of 
4
 Blacks, Second (1891); Sixth (abridged) (1991). Also, Bouvier's (1914). 
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the State of Utah. Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
"...[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." Const. Amend., art. XIV. 
Article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution accordingly provides: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
Perhaps the rationale of the foregoing is nowhere better expressed than by the words 
of former United States Supreme Court Justice, George Sutherland, who, in a 1921 address 
before the New York Bar when he was president of the American Bar Association, stated 
thusly: 
"Property, per se, has no rights; but the individual — the man — has three 
great rights, equally sacred from arbitrary interference; the right to his life, 
the right to his liberty, and the right to his property. The three rights are so 
bound together as to be essentially one right. To give a man his life, but 
deny him his liberty, is to take from him all that makes life worth living. To 
give him his liberty but take from him the property which is the fruit and 
badge of his liberty, is to still leave him a slave." 
That the court below clearly recognized these fundamental tenets are inextricably 
intertwined with due process cannot be doubted in view of its cited statements. Equally 
doubtless is the fact that these tenets have application to matters both criminal and civil 
as well as at law or in equity. The issues on appeal in this case raise valid due process 
questions involving equity and equal protection, which issues could have been fully argued 
at trial but for the court's demonstrated, untimely pretrial restriction. However true it may 
be that "by not arguing an issue or presenting pertinent evidence before the trial court, an 
appellant denies the trial court the opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusion of 
law relevant to the issues raised or objections to evidence," LeBaron &Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel 
Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d479, 483 n. 6 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991); accord State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 
611 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993) (trial court should be allowed first opportunity to address claim that 
it has erred), this rationale seemingly has no application where, as here, the court itself was 
the principal actor in substantially precluding Defendant from such opportunity, even prior 
to the event of trial. Owing principally to this restriction on time for trial, numerous issues 
of fact in this case remain yet unadjudicated, some in their entirety, and particularly with 
respect to the issues set forth in Defendant's counterclaim pursuant to Part B thereof, 
although not strictly limited thereto. As the absence of substantive findings of fact upon 
numerous unadjudicated material issues renders it virtually impossible to "marshal the 
evidence" necessary to mount a successful challenge thereto, it becomes equally impossible 
to comply with this Court's holding expressed in Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 
(Ut.Ct.App., 1993) ("Appellate courts will not address the challenge unless the appellant 
has properly marshaled the evidence"). Moreover, Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., provides, in 
pertinent part, that "...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Ibid. Given the 
totality of the circumstances in this case and the unadjudicated documentary evidence 
necessarily published in the record as the proximate result of the abbreviated proceedings, 
it is not difficult to see that the court, by its own discretionary acts, effectively precluded 
itself of the opportunity to find upon material facts and to judge witness credibility upon 
direct examination thereof; all of which effectively operated to deprive Defendant of both 
substantive and procedural due process. Where, as here, the court below failed to 
adequately find upon relevant and highly material facts and issues,5 the same are rendered 
non-existent and therefore incapable of either being upheld or adjudged to be clearly 
These issues comprise the balance of the questions in this appeal. 
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erroneous, as contemplated by Rule 52. To the extent such failure constitutes error, the 
judgment rendered on that basis is due to be reversed. Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of 
County Commas., 589 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah, 1979) (failure to find upon all material issues 
raised by the pleadings is reversible error); LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 
2d 260, 262, 420 P.2d 615, 616 (1966) (It is the duty of the trial court to find upon all 
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the failure to do so is reversible error), citing 
Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 9, 257 P.2d 673, 676; see also, Gaddis Investment Co. v. 
Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 and cases cited therein. Defendant's counterclaim 
pleadings raised such material issues, as set forth more fully hereinafter. It is equally 
settled that it is the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find facts upon all material 
issues submitted for decision unless findings are waived. Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 
1112,1114 (Utah, 1977). By untimely precluding Defendant from arguing at trial various 
issues previously determined by the court as "discoverable" and legitimate,w6 the court, by 
its own discretionary action, created the very circumstance whereby it failed to enter 
adequate findings, and on that basis alone the judgment requires vacating. In this case, 
such findings were not only inadequate, but to the extent they remain unadjudicated at 
trial they are clearly non-existent. Accordingly, Defendant argues that the absence of 
adequate findings duly framed by the court renders the same legally insufficient. 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991) (Appellants need not marshal 
evidence when findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as 
factual determinations; rather, appellant can simply argue legal insufficiency of court's 
findings as framed). See also, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 
6
 See, for example, P.T., 10 December 1993, p. 16, lines 5-8: 
"The Court: ...[TJo tell you the truth, there's a number of items here that 
certainly there is legitimate discovery and that they ought to be able to have 
information.,, 
7 No. 8, October 1994, p.25. Ibid. 
Of equal relevance in this case is the fact that neither is due process dependent, in 
any respect, upon a specified dollar amount. Nevertheless, the record clearly shows that 
the court below obviously considered "certain" amounts, even those in excess of Plaintiffs 
claim,7 to be of questionable merit where, during the course of trial, the court impliedly 
stated: 
"Let me ask you (inaudible) a whole trial over payment on a $5,000 claim?" 
(R.T., p. 23, lines 23-24.) 
Yet, at the first pretrial conference held 10 December 1993, the court had sent mixed signals 
in this regard where it had previously said: 
"... - - [a]nd this is after all a relatively modest case. The amount sued 
upon, well, it's $4,000. It's an amount to which there's - - this is obviously 
not an insubstantial amount of money and certainly attorneys ought to be 
able to be well prepared before they go to trial for that - - for that kind of 
case. On the other hand it's not a 40,000 — or a $400,000 case." P.T., 10 
December 1993, pp. 11-12; lines 25, 1-6, respectively. 
While the court's comments in this regard were at best inappropriate in view of its 
known jurisdictional limitation precluding it from even deciding matters in excess of 
$20,000.00,8 nevertheless, the plain inference conveyed by the court's comments was that 
due process is seemingly functionally-dependent upon the amount at issue, viz,, the greater 
the amount in controversy, the more process that is due, and vice-versa. This is 
particularly repugnant when considered in light of the fact that the U. S. Constitution itself, 
for example, requires only that "...[w]here the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, ...". U. S. Const. Amend. VII. 
7
 The amount originally sought in Plaintiffs complaint was $3,976.64. 
8
 § 78-4-7, Utah Code Ann., provides: "The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both 
law and equity, in all matters if the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court 
costs, ..." 
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Moreover, neither does decisional law, federal or state, reflect any such monetary-amount 
bias, and particularly with respect to actions daiming under the FDCPA, as may be seen 
in the following federal appellate cases and the amounts in controversy therein decided: 
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314,1316 (2nd Cir., 1993): $9.42; Crosskv v. Lieberman, 868 
F.2d 566,567 (3rd Cir., 1989): $297.79; Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 
F.2d 1222,1224 (9th Cir., 1989): $262.20; and Pressleu v. Capital Credit & Collection Service. 
Inc., 760 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir., 1985): $126.07. Numerous federal district cases also 
demonstrate a similar lack of bias with respect to the monetary amounts in controversy: 
Seabrook v. Onandaga Bureau of Medical Economics, Inc., 705 F.Supp. 81, 82 (N.D.N. Y., 
1989): $198.00; Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 174, 175 (W.D.N.Y., 1988): 
$80.20, $31.96; Kimberv. Federal Financial Corporation, 668 F.Supp. 1480,1482 (M.D.Ala., 
1987): $150.70; Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 864, 867 (D.N.D., 1981): 
$958.65; Rutynav. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc., 478 F.Supp. 980, 981 (N.D.Dl., 1979): 
$56.00; Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corporation, 454 F.Supp. 937,938 (N.D.Miss., 1978) 
([F]DCPA provides an independent jurisdictional grant without regard to jurisdictional 
amount). See also In Re Scrimpsher, Bkrtcy., 17 B.R. 999,1007 (N.D.N.Y., 1982): $245.93, 
citing Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 494 F.Supp. 824, 826 (N.D.Ga., 1980) 
(federal student loan for tuition qualified as a 'debt' under FDCPA). State precedent is no 
different: Action Professional Service v. Kiggins, 458 N.W.2d 365, 366 (S.D., 1990): $217; 
Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93, 96 (Wyo., 1989): $144.99; Venes v. 
Professional Service Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Minn. App., 1984): $552.40; Philips 
v. Periodical Publishers' Service Bureau, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 154, 155 (S.C.App., 1988), cert, 
granted, 300 S.C. 444, 388 S.E.2d 787 (1989): $8.05. 
The foregoing decisions conclusively demonstrate that, contrary to the inferences of 
the court below, due process clearly does not hang by any thread so tenuous as the mere 
monetary amount at issue. Thus,, to the extent the court's decision to untimely restrict the 
time for trial was based upon this shortfall from what it apparently deemed to be a 
"meritorious/1 albeit notably undefined, amount at issue, particularly where the court 
referred to amounts ranging from twice to twenty times that of its jurisdiction to decide, 
Defendant was concomitantly denied substantive and procedural due process and unduly 
prejudiced thereby. The inappropriateness of the rationale behind the court's comment in 
this regard was soundly rejected by the Supreme Court years ago when it considered an 
analogous fact situation regarding the necessity of making findings on the material facts 
as opposed to reasonings of the court's conscience. In reversing the decision of the trial 
court and vacating the judgment on remand in that respect, the Court said: 
"The necessity of making findings of fact on the disputed issues is given 
emphasis in this case by the statement we have quoted above, made by the 
trial judge: that although he would not allow recovery he 'feels that the 
plaintiff has a moral entitlement' to additional money. This is particularly so 
because this case is in equity wherein the plea for redress is directed to the 
conscience of the court. The observation referred to impresses us as a candid 
indication that the matter was not settled to his satisfaction. However well 
intentioned, it seems a futile suggestion in the face of difficulties which drove 
the parties to a lawsuit involving in excess of $25,000. It appears not to have 
been helpful to the parties, nor to the court in dealing with the already 
sufficient perplexities which this situation presents." LeGrand Johnson v. 
Peterson, 18 Utah 2d, at 262, 420 P.2d, at 616. 
With respect to due process issues such as the one on appeal here, the Utah Supreme 
Court has said: 
"That the rights of individuals and the assurance that they will be 
safeguarded by the courts and the process of law are considered essential to 
the maintenance of what we are pleased to call our well-ordered society is 
shown by the inclusion of Art. I, Sec. 11 in our Utah Constitution: 
'All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, * * * shall have remedy by due course of 
law, * * * and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party'." 
See also Barnhartv. Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., 398 P.2d 873, 876 (Utah, 1965), 
cited in Citu of St George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah, 1993). Ibid. 
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It is thus to be seen that the untimely restrictions placed upon the time for trial as 
imposed by the court below within mere hours of the scheduled trial time, which 
restrictions unduly and essentially deprived Defendant of the day in court to which she 
was unquestionably entitled, runs counter to both the expressed purpose and the spirit of 
our system of justice. By the court's own act it precluded itself from fulfilling its 
responsibility of remaining fully available to properly adjudicate all material issues and 
controversies presented by this case, and in doing so substantially impaired the rights of 
Defendant in particular to examine witnesses in prosecution of her counterclaim. The 
reticence with which this should, if ever, be done is further emphasized by realizing that 
such arbitrary discretion, even in advance of trial, substantially cuts into the procedural 
safeguards that otherwise our law so adequately provides for. But even more significant 
is the fact that a less clear and complete record results, thus impairing to a substantial 
degree the right to an accurate review of all the material facts on appeal. 
The circuit court's error, as a matter of law, by untimely restricting the time for trial 
thus depriving Defendant of her rightful day in court to which she was clearly entitled, 
constituted an unreasonable denial of an essential, fundamental right. The resultant loss 
of due process and equal protection carried with it substantial harm and prejudice where 
the record is devoid of facts it should otherwise contain. For the reasons set forth herein, 
the judgment rendered against Defendant is, therefore, due to be reversed; the error not 
being harmless. 
(Respecting Part A) 
ISSUE #2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where 
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(c), 
U.R.GP., the affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claims were stale and thus barred by the 
doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel? 
The gravamen of Plaintiffs complaint stems from the assignment only in 1991 of an 
alleged debt purported to be then owed by Defendant to Plaintiffs Assignor. However, 
the underlying issue in this case, and one that merits review on appeal, is the fact of 
Assignor's breach of a prior contractual agreement with Defendant, dated 31 March 1981, 
which breach remained uncured and unaccounted for through the date of trial, thus 
antedating Plaintiffs assignment by nearly a full decade. As of 4 October 1982, Plaintiffs 
Assignor was then indebted to Defendant in the principal amount of at leasst $1,235.26, 
exclusive of interest accruals since that time, and was thus guilty of having unclean hands. 
At trial, Defendant was able to preponderate on the fact that via her signed contract, 
Plaintiff's Assignor was so indebted and had thereafter failed at all times during the 
pendency of this action to account for, record, and/or credit to Defendant's dental account 
all or even any part of this long-standing, prior contractual indebtedness.9 Assignor's 
dental services rendered to Defendant were completed on or about 25 September 1984 and 
Plaintiff proved, as well, using Assignor's own statement that the final insurance payment 
of $1,250 had, in fact, been received by Assignor on or about 22 March 1985.10 At no time 
thereafter did Assignor ever provide to Defendant a complete accounting of the total dental 
charges for services rendered in her behalf, nor any record of the insurance payments 
received with respect thereto, or with regard to Assignor's direct negotiations with 
Defendant's carrier, nor the application of all or any part of the amounts due under its 
9
 See R.T., p. 74, lines 8-9: "...[A]t any rate you win on that one. For that I deducted 
twelve thirty-five. ..." See also, R.T., pp. 76-77, lines 21-25 and line 1, respectively: "The 
big ticket item that changes it a lot is the $1,235 and that's what — and you won on that 
one, that's what trials are for. I'm convinced that at least your subjective impression was 
you're going to get a $1,200 credit for that machine. That may or may not have been the 
deal but they weren't here to contest it so that's the way that goes." 
1 0
 See R.T., p. 75, line 20: H...[t]he eighth payment of 1,250,...". See also R.Idx., 
Defendant's trial exhibit of Assignor's handwritten statement indicating this amount having 
been paid as a part of her total of payments rendered, and also as demonstrated in her 
"summary of payments." (Ridx., 256.) 
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original contract default. The evidence in this case also reflects, in addition, that at some 
indeterminate point in time prior to 31 December 1990, Plaintiffs Assignor purged its 
records of information pertaining to Defendant's account.11 Thereafter, on 25 April 1991, 
or more than 6-1/2 years after the completion of Defendant's dental treatments, and more 
than 10 years after Assignor's contractual default to Defendant, Assignor elected to assign 
to Plaintiff the alleged debt purported to be owed by Defendant for the purposes of 
collection. Owing to Assignor's inexcusable delay in asserting its claim and the resultant 
prejudice and disadvantage suffered by Defendant thereby, it was therefore proper for 
Defendant, upon answering Plaintiffs complaint, to assert the equitable affirmative defense 
that "Plaintiffs claims are barred on the grounds of waiver, laches, and estoppel."12 
The '"Doctrine of laches' is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and 
not those who slumber on their rights." It is the "unreasonable or unexplained delay in 
asserting [a] right which works disadvantage to another. Laches requires an element of 
estoppel or neglect which has operated to prejudice of defendant."13 In this regard, 
Bouvier's14 indicates that: 
"'... [t]his doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy which requires 
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims,' Mackall v. 
Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 11 S.Ct. 178, 34 L.Ed. 776, and 'The question whether 
one is precluded from equitable relief by the staleness of his demand is for 
the court and not for the jury.' Raymond v. Flavel, 27 Ore. 219, 40 P. 158. It 
goes on to state that 'Courts of equity withhold relief from those who have 
delayed the assertion of their claims for an unreasonable time, and the mere 
11
 See Record Index ("R.Idx."), pp. 213-14, a computer-generated document entitled 
"Account Ledger Card." See page 1, line 1, Column 5: "Ref" "Purge." 
1 2
 See Defendant's Amended Answer and Counterclaim, "Seventh Affirmative 
Defense," p. 5. Ibid. 
1 3
 Black's, Abridged Sixth Ed., p. 606. 
1 4
 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3 vol. ed., (1914). 
fact that suit was brought within a reasonable time does not prevent the 
application of the doctrine of laches when there is a want of diligence in the 
prosecution.1 Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 449, 15 S.Ct. 162, 39 L.Ed. 218; 
Hagerman v. Bates, 5 CaLApp. 391, 38 P. 1100. The question of laches 
depends not upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the 
cause of action accrued, but upon whether, under all the circumstances, the 
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in not instituting the 
proceedings sooner.' Tawnsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U.S. 171,16 S.Ct 258, 
40 L.Ed. 383; Mclntire v. Pruor, 173 U.S. 38, 19 S.Ct. 352, 43 L.Ed. 606; 'It is 
not measured by the statute of limitations.' Alsop, supra" 
Laches embodies the fundamental principle that "he who seeks equity must do 
equity," therefore, "having sought equity, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to do equity." 
Coleman Co., Inc. v. Southwest Field Irrigation Co., 584 P.2d 883, 884; (Utah 1978); accord, 
Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n., 425 P.2d 405, (Utah, 1967). As Defendant 
properly asserted the affirmative defense of laches in her amended answer and 
counterclaim, she dtdy met her burden under the rationale of Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 
253, 257 (Utah, 1963), wherein the Supreme Court stated: 
"Burden of taking some affirmative action should be on him who accuses 
the other of delay and unless he has taken such action or in some manner put 
other party on notice that action is required, he cannot take advantage of the 
delay." Id. 
In further clarification of the foregoing as respecting the instant case, it is instructive to 
note the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii wherein it stated: 
"Equitable doctrine of laches applies where long acquiescence in assertion 
of adverse rights has occurred,... or when, during inexcusable delay evidence 
has become obscured and, under circumstances of case, it is too late to 
ascertain merits of controversy." Anderson v. Anderson, 585 P.2d 938, 947 
(Hawaii, 1978). 
See also Brahenderx. Kit Mfg. Co., 568 P.2d 547 (Mont, 1977) ("Laches" is negligence in 
assertion of a right; it exists when there has been an unexplained delay of such duration 
or character as to render enforcement of asserted right inequitable); Clark v. Chipman, 510 
P.2d 1257, 212 Kan. 259 (1973) ("Laches" is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims 
and courts of equity will regard long passage of time in asserting claims with disfavor 
apart from any particular statute of limitations); Longshaw v. Corbitt, 420 P.2d 980, 4 
Ariz. App. 408 (1966) (The elements necessary to constitute laches are lack of diligence on 
the part of one and injury to another due to lack of diligence). 
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The record in this case clearly indicates that Plaintiffs claims suffered from the loss 
of relevant evidence as the proximate result of Assignor's inexcusable delay in the assertion 
of adverse rights, as indicated in the following excerpts: 
"The Court: ...[TJhat's why I'm saying that we're kidding ourselves if you 
think no matter how able or wonderful you can be and how attentive and I'd 
really try to listen we'd spend the next week trying to pour through this but 
we can't discover it." (R.T., p. 64, lines 21-25.) 
And further on the court said: 
"...[W]e're talking about purged computer records and old records and at 
least what initially was kind of a handshake deal too, based on a separate 
business acquaintance and all of that lends itself into not being able to have 
the kind of facts I know that the attorneys would like to have in presenting 
a case." (R.T., p. 72, lines 20-25.) "...[A]nd what I've done is taken all of the 
extant records, understanding that there is a hole prior to 1986 - - 1984, I'm 
sorry." (R.T., p. 73, lines 10-12.) "...pQt is the position of the Plaintiff that the 
$515 either wasn't paid or it was already reduced somewhere back in the 
olden days before I can get the records." (R.T., p. 74, lines 14-17.) "...[TJhat 
may or may not have been the deal but they weren't here to contest it so 
that's the way that goes." (R.T., p. 77-78, lines 25, 1, respectively.) 
Thus it is evident that not only was Assignor negligent in asserting and assigning 
its claim for an unconscionable period, but as a result of that negligence Plaintiffs case 
suffered markedly from the loss of evidence and the disappearance of at least one material 
witness with whom Defendant had dealt in 1982: 
"Q. (By Mr. Stanton) When Associated Dental Products changed names to 
Oral Dental Health you spoke to someone about the machine. Who did you 
speak with? 
"A. (Mrs. Murdock) The owner of Associated Dental Group. 
"Q. Who was that? 
"A. His name was Craig. I can't remember his last name, it's been 12 years 
ago, but he signed it and you can't hardly read his signature, but I do have 
a document. 
1 5
 The "document" here testified to by the Defendant is the Diversified Office Systems, 
Inc. Sales Agreement ("Defendant's Contract") referred to at the outset of the Statement of 
the Case, which the court refused to admit into evidence at trial, notwithstanding the fact 
that Defendant prevailed on this evidence and was awarded a principal-only credit of 
$1235.00 therefor "by a preponderance of the evidence." See R.T. p. 39, line 13, through p. 
(continued...) 
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"Q. And it went from Associated Dental to Oral Dental Health? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Was he an owner in Oral Dental Health? 
"A. He owned it. 
"Q. Okay. 
"Mr. MuUiner: I am going to object to this, Your Honor. The document that's 
been admitted establishes that Oral Health Center is Kent Davis and Oral 
Dalton. This other person, I have no idea who he is, I have no idea where 
we're going with this. If she signed - - " (R.T., pp. 44-45, lines 10-25, 1-3, 
respectively.) 
The testimony elicited here concerned events which antedated Assignor's assignment 
to Plaintiff of its claim by nearly a decade thus resulting in counsel's confusion, and further 
demonstrating the underlying grounds and justification for Defendant's affirmative defense 
of laches based upon Assignor's lack of diligence and unclean hands with the resultant 
injustice certain to occur if Plaintiffs claims are not held barred. Moreover, the court's 
reference to "...[w]hat initially was kind of a handshake deal too..." is also in error as the 
agreement to trade Assignor's default on Defendant's contract was secondary to the 
contract itself. The fact that Assignor failed to keep its commitment under the "handshake 
deal," so-called, had no legal effect upon its prior contractual obligation to Defendant thus 
further proving its unclean hands. 
As indicated herein, the availability of the equitable defense of laches is contingent 
upon the establishment of two elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; 
and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas Brothers 
Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah, 1975); 
cited in Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah, 1980); Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah, 1990); Sandy Citu v. Salt 
15(...continued) 
52, line 3, and pp. 73-74, lines 22-25 and 1-10, respectively. A copy of that document, 
together with the Diversified delivery receipt, the Associated Dental Group check stub, and 
the business card bearing the name "Craig," are annexed hereto in Appendix EL 
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Lake County, 827 R2d 227, 230 n.5 (Utah, 1992). Both of those elements are abundantly 
evident in this case, together with the additional factors of the loss of evidence, the 
unavailability of a material witness named "Craig,H and the unclean hands of Plaintiffs 
Assignor. 
In stun, laches developed as an equitable analog to legal statutes of limitation and 
operates, when found, as a bar to an action, not as an element to diminish an award. See 
G. Dobbs, Remedies, 43. "The basis of laches in equity is unreasonable delay and lack of 
diligence extending for so long a time or under circumstances that it would be inequitable 
to grant relief." Rhoads v. Albertson's, Inc., 574 P.2d 114,116 (Colo.App., 1977), reversed, 
582 P.2d 1049. "Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing 
a disadvantage to the other party." Papanikolas, supra, 535 P.2d at 1260. The record in 
this case clearly demonstrates Assignor's long acquiescence in assertion of adverse rights 
pursuant to an alleged claim against Defendant where the record in this case shows that 
Assignor waited for more than 6-1/2 years before electing to act in that regard, and where, 
during such inexcusable delay, evidence has become obscured and material witnesses, other 
than Defendant, having first-hand knowledge of the facts were not available. Anderson, 
supra, 585 P.2d at 947. As such, Assignor's alleged claim was barred from the outset by 
the equitable doctrine of laches and that guilt was not overcome by the mere assignment 
of that claim to a third party collection agency. Thus, Defendant properly raised this 
affirmative defense in her pleadings where Plaintiffs claims were stale and, therefore, 
barred ab initio. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed with instructions to vacate. 
ISSUE NO, 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection under 
the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to Assignor's 
contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts pursuant to her 
unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted in order to obtain 
an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiffs daims as provided pursuant to Rule 
13(c), U.RGP.? 
Notwithstanding Defendant's direct testimony regarding her clearly unambiguous 
contract dated 31 March 1982, upon which Plaintiffs Assignor had originally defaulted 
nearly six months prior to Defendant's first visit following negotiations to effect a trade for 
dental services in lieu of Assignor's payment therefor (see footnote #16, ante), and further 
notwithstanding the fact that Defendant was able to establish that no credit for those 
amounts had ever been applied towards her dental charges in consideration of Assignor's 
default, the court nevertheless, refused to admit Defendant's contract into evidence despite 
her argument to the contrary. At one of several inaudible sidebars that occurred during 
the course of trial, this issue was discussed. Defendant argued that if her contract were not 
admitted as evidence and the interest terms therein were not going to be allowed in 
calculating an equal or greater offset against Assignor's contract, except for the principal 
amount as it existed 12 years previous, then neither should Assignor's contract receive the 
benefit of interest calculations in determination of the final judgment award. To hold 
otherwise would be to stand the doctrine of equal protection on its head. Moreover, while 
ignoring the fact that Defendant's contract provided for an equal imposition of interest, the 
court reasoned, rationalized, and took great pain to explain to Defendant why Assignor's 
contract should be upheld: 
"The Court: Now Mr. Stanton on several occasions has rather eloquently 
argued, and I want you to know that he didn't surrender the position, he 
argued that - - so I don't want you to fault him at all. I take responsibility 
for the ruling - - he asked that I not allow the one and-a-half percent interest 
on the declining balance, claiming that it's their fault, sort of, because they 
were so dilatory in making insurance claims or they - - they were, rather, 
insurance company and that sort of thing. 
"I guess all I can tell is that, again, that's what, not only are lawsuits 
determined and filed so you can contest facts but also there's some legal 
arguments that attorneys made and it does seem to me that as between 
apportioning, you know, who bears the loss of use of money and you signing 
a contract has to mean something. I'm already finding all kinds of things like 
that there's a sewing machine - - a postage machine. I tried to give you the 
benefit of every reasonable construction but I just really can't close my eyes 
and simply rule on the one and-a-half percent. I think I need to - - this is, 
after all a business relationship, it's not just judgment. And it seems to me 
that there's just a time value of money that's different than in paying services 
in 1992 and now in 1994 than it is paying for services in 1984. 
"We are talking about an old account, so I can - - I think we'd really 
be - - I would not be doing any justice to the contract, Ms. Murdock. I know 
that you probably have some emotional credit that's not recorded. I do want 
you to know that Mr. Stanton made the appropriate legal arguments and 
pleasantly and persistently asked me to rule otherwise." (R.T., pp. 78-79, lines 
9-25 and 1-13, respectively.) 
In this regard the court erred for several reasons: First, the exclusion of Defendant's 
contract from evidence constituted a denial of equal protection where Assignor had 
previously agreed to be bound by its terms upon execution; Second, Defendant was unduly 
prejudiced by the imposition of interest under Assignor's contract while being denied the 
same benefit pursuant to the terms of her contract in order to calculate an equitable offset; 
Third, although Defendant had agreed to trade an equivalent amount of dental services to 
cure Assignor's default, that default remained uncured where Assignor thereafter failed to 
account for or credit Defendant's account with such amounts and such failure did not 
operate to extinguish Assignor's obligations under the terms of Defendant's contract; 
Fourtfi, by excluding Defendant's contract from evidence, the court failed to properly 
interpret the same, thereby depriving Defendant of due process and equal protection; and 
Fifth, by limiting Defendant's award to the 1982 principal-only amount then due as a 
matter of law, the court thereby failed, in addition, to determine what the parties intended 
when Assignor executed Defendant's contract 
Because Defendant's contract is highly relevant to the facts in this case, due process 
and fundamental fairness required at least a reasonable interpretation thereof. To the 
extent that Defendant's "w[i]n on that one"16 constituted an "interpretation" as a matter of 
law without regard for extrinsic evidence, the court's interpretation is afforded no 
R.T., p. 76, line 22. 
particular weight on appeal. In that regard, this Court has said: 
"If the trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law without regard for 
extrinsic evidence, we afford its interpretation no particular weight. 
Seashores, Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Ut.Ct.App., 1987). The primary 
rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the parties intended by 
looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, 
giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole.' 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah, 1982)." C/. Baker v. 
Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Ut.Ct.App., 1988). 
See also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 
(Utah, 1990); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060,1061-62 (Utah, 1981); Hal Taylor 
Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah, 1982). 
As is the case with Assignor's contract, under the equally unambiguous terms of 
Defendant's contract it also provides as follows: "...[tjhe purchaser agrees to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee and agrees to pay interest on past due accounts at the rate of 1-
1/2% per month, 18% per year." As this provision clearly constitutes an essential element 
of "all of its parts," by the court's failure to allow "what the parties intended" when the 
contract was executed that interpretation should thus be afforded "no particular weight" 
on this appeal. To the extent the court erred by summarily excluding Defendant's contract 
from evidence, the judgment should be reversed and remanded with an order directing 
that Defendant's contract be admitted in the record as relevant evidence, and that a proper 
interpretation thereof be made for calculation of the amount of interest to be applied, 
consistent with its terms as the parties intended, as an offset against the amount awarded 
by the court under the terms of Assignor's contract, as sought in Defendant's counterclaim 
pursuant to Rule 13(c). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it 
calculated Plaintiffs claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's unproven 
amounts in light of finding that Plaintiffs case suffered from lack of adequate evidence in 
the record? 
Plaintiff commenced its action by praying for "judgment against Defendant in the 
amount of $3,976.64, interest, costs, and such other and further relief as to the Court seems 
meet in the premises." Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs complaint states as follows: 
"3. Defendant is indebted to Oral Health Center (the assignor) for 
professional services and the amount due as of November 4,1991, is the sum 
of $3,976.64." (RJdx. p. 1 & 2.) 
Paragraph 2 thereof provides: 
"2. The debts herein sued upon were assigned to Plaintiff by written 
assignment. The entire amount thereof is past due and owing." Ibid. 
At trial, however, the record shows that Plaintiff was unable to prove these 
allegations as the proximate result of Assignor's inexcusable delay in asserting its claim, 
together with its proven inaccurate accounting and recordation methods, the loss of 
relevant evidence, and the unavailability of a material witness having first-hand knowledge 
of the facts from the outset. As a result of these facts Plaintiff was awarded only $528.00, 
plus an indeterminate amount of interest to be calculated over a period certain and added 
thereto. But even this amotint was arrived at in error where the court based its findings 
not on the amount set forth in Plaintiffs complaint, rather, it chose to rely, instead, on the 
erroneous information set forth in the hand-written monthly statements originally provided 
to Defendant by Assignor in 1984 and 1985 in arriving at "the highest gross amount"17 the 
court could ascertain from that "evidence," such being the sum of $5,328.00, rather than the 
$3,976.64 Plaintiff had sued for. Thus, Plaintiff (and Assignor) received, at the discretion 
of the court, the benefit of an added windfall of $1,350.00 more than they had even sued 
for. This, of course, more than totally negated the $1,235.00 credit Defendant had received 
as a principal-only award for Assignor's original default on her contract. Had the court 
1 7
 See R.T., p. 73, line 5, through p. 78, line 8. Notwithstanding this ruling in its favor, 
Plaintiff nevertheless prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, dated 5 January 
1995, setting forth therein a judgment amount, not of $528.00, but "...[i]n the principal sum 
of $1,761.49, $2,285.85 accumulated interest, and costs incurred herein." This set in motion 
a post-trial dispute which was only resolved at a hearing 5-1/2 months after trial on 5 May 
1995, and only then so this matter could be brought up on this appeal. 
properly based its calculations on the amount set forth in Plaintiffs complaint, as assigned 
and alleged by Assignor, the resultant amount would have been $822.00 in favor of 
Defendant, as derived from the difference between the $1,350.00 windfall and the $528.00 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the interest amounts notwithstanding. In arriving at this 
"highest gross amount," however, the court had to admit that "...[ijt's kind of a fiction how 
I arrived at it in a sense." (R.T., p. 80, lines 16-22.) By basing its calculations on this 
"highest gross amount" rather than the original amount assigned and subsequently sued 
upon by Plaintiff, the court erred further where it had already determined that the amount 
defaulted upon by Assignor under Defendants contract had never been credited to 
Defendant's account, hence her "w[i]n on that one." 
As it was established that as of 4 October 1982, Assignor was indebted to Defendant 
in the amount of at least $1,235.00, she should have started with a credit balance of that 
amount, against which dental charges would have been properly been deducted as they 
were incurred. Where it was determined at trial that this had not been the case, it was 
plain error for the court to thereafter conclude that the $5,328.00 figure was a valid point 
from which to begin its calculation of the final judgment amount, and particularly where 
the record reflects Assignor's own hand-written document indicating the total charges 
incurred by Defendant to be $4,975.00, between the dates of 4 October 1982 and 25 
September 1984. (R.Idx., #212.) (See R.T., p. 73, lines 12-21.) 
Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed and the court's calculations reviewed 
for a proper determination consistent with the evidence. 
ISSUE NO, 5: Did the circuit court err by finding that Defendant had failed to prove, 
"by a preponderance of the evidence/1 that she had a cause of action pursuant to the 
FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims thereunder 
as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial? 
At the conclusion of trial of Part A regarding the subject matter of Plaintiffs 
complaint, Defendant had to remind the court of her counterclaim alleging Plaintiffs 
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq„ and 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") § 13-11-19 et seq., where the court had 
previously denied Plaintiffs motion in limine in this regard at the outset of the 
proceedings.18 As the restricted time allotted for trial had already been consumed in its 
entirety, Defendant suggested that since Plaintiffs answers to discovery were previously 
published and admitted into evidence, and where it appeared that Plaintiff had admitted 
to the alleged violations therein, that the court review those answers and base its decision 
in comparison with the provisions of the FDCPA and make its ruling accordingly. At this 
the court then stated: 
,fWill you just give me a Reader's Digest — what do you believe — what is 
the conduct that violated the — ... IVe got your counterclaim and exhibits." 
(R.T., p. 86, lines 17-19, 24-25.) 
Following a brief discussion in this regard the court expressed some doubts: 
,fWell, okay. Help me a little bit. Pm going to tell you right now that I 
don't see the violation. If you want — I see they sent a letter —". (R.T. p. 92, 
lines 9-11.) (The court was here referring to one of two letters sent by 
Defendant to Plaintiff during the pendency of this action.) 
Defendant subsequently offered to submit a brief further outlining the specific provisions 
of the FDCPA in detail, which the court declined, stating: 
"I think it would be fair if you just told me right now and let Mr. Mulliner 
argue back right now. ... Tell me, why is that a violation?" (R.T., p. 92, lines 
14-15; line 20.) 
Defendant proceeded to explain to the court that the FDCPA establishes the 
violations and that the specific violations alleged to have been committed by Plaintiff were 
R.T., p. 4, lines 14-16; p. 11, lines 20-25. 
listed in the counterclaim presently before the court.19 Notwithstanding this explanation 
and attempt to direct the court's attention to the specific allegations set forth in Defendant's 
counterclaim pleadings and exhibits then before the court, and having previously referred 
the court to the concurring notes prepared by its law clerk on the subject,20 the court 
proceeded to demonstrate its fundamental misconception of the provisions of both the 
FDCPA and the UCSPA by the following statement wherein the court not only combined 
the provisions of the acts just stated, but hopelessly confused the issues instead by mixing 
in the largely off-point matters involved in Part A regarding the subject matter of Plaintiffs 
complaint: 
'Shouldn't rely on a 1982 agreement on a postage machine that I give to her 
if you're asking me about fairness, and I do understand that the statute 
speaks to liberally and that sort of thing, but there's nothing in here that 
jumps up and down and says that your client was misled or made some 
payments or was browbeaten to do anything. She certainly wasn't 
browbeaten into anything, she went out and got a very fine attorney to 
represent her." (R.T., p. 93, lines 14-21.) 
Where it was thus evident that the court had completely confused the separate 
nature of the provisions designated in Part A relating to Plaintiffs complaint and those 
regarding the issues and allegations contained in Part B counterclaiming Plaintiffs alleged 
violations of both the FDCPA and the UCSPA, together with the fact that no testimony 
with regard to Plaintiffs alleged violation of these acts was going to be permitted owing 
to the lack of time to fully prosecute the matter, the following conversation ensued: 
"Mr. Stanton: (for Defendant) All right. We've made our allegations in the 
counterclaim, they're specific in there for you. We've provided the 
admissions and then the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based upon those, 
make your ruling and then well go from there." 
1 9
 R.T., p. 92, lines 21-22; p. 93, lines 12-13. 
20
 R.T., pp. 7-8, lines 23-25 and 1-24, respectively. See Appendix for copy of 
handwritten notes of law clerk, Wayne D. Jones, which Defendant moved to publish, and 
admit into evidence. 
"Mr. Mulliner: (for Plaintiff) And we admit we sent those documents. We 
deny that those documents in any way violate the Act and I take it that that's 
your ruling, that they don't violate the Act." (R.T., pp. 93-94, lines 22-25,1-5.) 
Further discussion ensued between counsel for both Parties and the court, but no 
examination of witnesses transpired concerning Defendant's counterclaim allegations, the 
court having previously decided as follows: 
"Again, let me just say for those of you who are interested in Ms. Murdock's 
behalf and for the collection agency wondering why it is we don't proceed 
with the trial and do more testimony, that this is just not the kind of case that 
anyone's oral testimony that's here today could offer any additional help to 
us." (R.T., p. 73, lines 5-10.) 
Following the brief, cursory discussions regarding Defendant's allegations pursuant to the 
provisions of the FDCPA, the court then found as follows: 
"Do you have anything else? Okay, then I'm not going to deny plaintiffs 
claim for relief under the counterclaim and based on what has been presented 
to me in Exhibit A, 111 find that the defendant failed to meet its burden of 
proof of providing evidence to the Court." (R.T., p. 99, lines 12-16.) 
Whereupon, Defendant then queried the court as follows: 
"Mr. Stanton: Is that based upon admissions as well or just upon Exhibit 
A?" 
"The Court: It's based on everything that you say and what you didn't say. 
It's based on the evidence that I have before me at this time (inaudible) I was 
told to go back to my room and read or something. And so at this time then 
I'll just - - the judgment on the counterclaim will stand but we're going to let 
that - - hold that for this few days."21 (R.T., p. 99, lines 17-24.) 
Following this exchange a short sidebar occurred where the exhibits to be pubUshed were 
discussed. In that regard the court stated: 
"The Court: Now let's see, I've been handed some exhibits. Let's see — the 
one exhibit. Tell me what you want. What we ought to do is very carefully 
retain the correct exhibits in case Mr. Stanton wants to have the appellate 
court look at it. (R.T., p. 100, lines 5-9.) ... Ill hand that to you. Is that all 
right there? That's another case I've got. You've got that one exhibit." 
(Whereupon this portion of the hearing was inaudible.) ... 
21
 In the latter part of this statement, the court was referring to the time alloted for 
calculaing the interest amounts previously awarded to Plaintiff at trial, which award 
constitutes the subject matter of Issue No. 5 herein. 
"Do you move to publish?" 
"Mr. Stanton: Yes, admit those." (Inaudible.) (R.T., 100, lines 20-25.) 
"The Court: If you decide that you want the appellate court to look at that, 
I'm certainly not — 111 do everything I possibly can to make the record 
clearer." (R.T., pp. 101, lines 1-3.) ... So, well, we ought to have those and the 
plaintiffs answers to defendant's requests for admissions and certificate of 
service, response to her second set. These are the items you wanted. 
"Mr. Stanton: Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2." 
"The Court: All right." (R.T., 101, lines 6-11.) 
In order for the Court of Appeals to more fully understand the "fundamental 
misconception"22 of the court below respecting its conclusoiy analysis of Defendant's 
counterclaims under the FDCPA and the UCSPA, it must first understand something of the 
congressional intent underlying its passage of the FDCPA and its purpose for authorizing 
even greater protection under state laws — in this case the UCSPA.23 Owing to the lack 
of abundance of Utah decisional law regarding the FDCPA, it is first deemed appropriate 
to consult the federal decisions that have addressed these issues and, secondly, various 
other state supreme and appellate court decisions so published. 
The FDCPA traces its genesis to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the 
"FTC Act") of 1914. 38 Stat. 717, ch. 311 (15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq.) Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC 
Act reads: 
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 
In passing the Act, doubtless Congress was aware of the language rendered in 
Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J.C. Dawd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2nd Cir., 1910), an unfair 
22
 The phrase employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision rendered 
in Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir., 1988). 
23
 See Senate Report No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in in 1977 U. S. Code 
Cong. Admin. News 1695, 1700 ("The Committee believes that this law ought not to 
foreclose the States from enacting or enforcing their own laws regarding debt collection. 
Accordingly, this legislation annuls only 'inconsistent' State laws, with stronger State laws 
not regarded as inconsistent.") See also, § 13-11-19(2) Utah Code Ann. 
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practices case, wherein the court had held: 
"The law is not made 'for the protection of experts, but for the public — that 
vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the 
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are 
governed by appearances and general impressions'." 
See also, Charles of the Ritz Dist Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 676, 679 
(2nd Cir., 1944); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168,1172-3 (11th Cir., 1985); Kimber 
v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480,1489 (M.D.Ala., 1987); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 
F.2d 1314,131849 (2nd Cir., 1993) (same). The FTC Act as initially enacted thus prohibited 
"unfair methods of competition." In 1938, Congress adopted the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, 
52 Stat. I l l , which added the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts and practices" to the original 
language. This was a legislative abnegation of the holding of F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 
U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587f 75 L.Ed. 1324 (1930), restricting the coverage of the original 
enactment to "protection of the public from the evils likely to result from the destruction 
of competition or the restriction of it in a substantial degree..." Id. at 647, 51 S.Ct. at 590, 
75 L.Ed. at 1329. In F.T.C. v. Brawn Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321, 86 S.Ct. 1501, 1504, 16 
L.Ed.2d 587, 591 (1966), a unanimous Supreme Court recognized that the Federal Trade 
Commission ("FTC") is endowed with "broad powers to declare trade practices unfair." The 
FTC has used both its legislative and adjudicatory powers to find deceptive collection 
practices unfair. It has adopted guidelines against debt collection deception.24 This 
infusion of FTC law and regulations satisfies the fundamental due process insistence "that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Groyned v. Citu ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972). The constitutional adequacy of the 
warning of proscribed conduct should be measured not only by common intelligence, but 
16 C.F.R. Part 237. See note 28, supra. 
also by "common practice." U. S. ex rel. Shottv. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191,198 (6th Cir., 1966), 
cert denied, 385 U.S. 1012, 87 S.Ct. 716, 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967). Ordinarily, two elements 
must be proved to establish a prima facie case of unfair or deceptive practices: (1) that the 
defendant is engaged in trade or commerce; and (2) that in the conduct of trade or 
commerce, an unfair act or practice has occurred. An act or practice is deceptive or unfair 
if it has the mere capacity or tendency to deceive. F. T C v , Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 
152, 62 S.Ct. 966, 968, 86 L.Ed. 1336,1340 (1942). See also, Resort Car Rentals Sys.. Inc. v. 
f. T. C, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir., 1975) cert, denied sub nom., MacKensie v. U. S., 423 
U.S. 827, 96 S.Ct. 41, 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975); Thiretv.F. T. C, 512 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir., 
1975); Spiegel Inc. v. F.T.C 494 F.2d59 (7th Cir., 1974) cert, denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 
175, 42 L.Ed.2d 140 (1974). An act or practice need not be "deceptive" to be "unfair." 
Unfairness will be determined by a variety of factors, including: 
"(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously 
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by 
statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is 
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other 
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to 
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)." 
F. T. C. v. Sperm & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5, 92 S.Ct. 898, 905, n.5, 31 
L.Ed.2d 170,179, n.5 (1972). Threats by debt collection agencies of imminent legal action 
when no such action is actually contemplated is a deceptive act or practice. Trans World 
Accounts v. F. T. C, 594 F.2d 212, 215, (9th Cir., 1979); Hearst Corp., 82 F.T.C. 951, 954 
(1966). Harassment of debtors by telephone calls to them, their relatives or their employers 
constitutes an unfair act or practice. Hearst Corp., 82 F.T.C. 1792, 1797 (1973); 
Neighborhood Periodical Club, In a, 81 F.T.C. 93,101 (1972). A misrepresentation by a debt 
collection agency that failure to pay an alleged debt will result in impairment of one's 
credit rating has been held to be an unfair and deceptive act or practice. Hearst Corp., 82 
F.T.C. 1792,1797 (1973); Neighborhood Periodical Club, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 93,101 (1972); Key 
Learning Systems, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 296, 306 (1972); Book Club Guild, Inc., 65 F.T.C. 785, 790 
(1964). 
In more recent years the FTC Act has since been amended several times. In 1968 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. was enacted. In 
1976 Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1640 et seq. These 
were followed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1970), 
and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1977) (Supp. 
IV1980). Under the latter, the draftsmen clearly stated that "The primary persons intended 
to be covered are independent debt collectors." S.Rep.No.382,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News. Ibid., at 1697. See In re Scrimpsher, 
17 B.R. 999,1011 (Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y., 1982), Id. These basic principles of consumer protection 
law took on their modern formulation in the years following the FTC Act. In this regard 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
,HIn evaluating the tendency of language to deceive, the Federal Trade 
Commission should look not to the most sophisticated readers but rather to 
the least' Exposition Press, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 295 F.2d 869, 
872 (2nd Cir., 1961). In recent years, as courts have incorporated the 
jurisprudence of the FTC Act into their interpretations of the FDCPA, the 
language of Exposition Press has gradually evolved into what we now know 
as the least-sophisticated-consumer standard. See, e ,g. leter, 760 F.2d at 1174-
75; Baker, 677 F.2d at 778." Clomon v. lackson, 988 F.2d 1314,1319 (2nd Cir., 
1993). 
Thus has evolved the original language of Florence and its progeny relating to 
"...[t]he public — that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the 
credulous...". See also Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. at 599; Kimber 
v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. at 1489; Swanson, supra, 869 F.2d 1222, 1225; 
Clomon, supra, 988 F.2d at 1318-19. In Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1175, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded, in pertinent part: 
"Because we believe that Congress intended the standard under the FDCPA 
to be the same as that enunciated in the relevant FTC cases ... we adopt the 
Exposition Press standard of least sophisticated consumer1 as previously 
followed by the federal courts in Baker, supra and Bingham, supra." 
This premise was based, in part, upon Jeter's reliance on the Alaska Supreme Court's 
decision in State v, O'Neill Investigations, Inc, 609 P.2d 520, 530 (Alaska, 1980). In that 
case the court disagreed with O'Neill's contention that "...[t]he recent enactment of the 
federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,... which specifically prohibits all false, deceptive, 
misleading, unfair or harassing collection practices, is evidence that such practices were not 
prohibited by prior federal law." In answer to this contention the Alaskan Court said: 
"This claim ignores the new rights and remedies created by the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act: consumers now have a private right of action against 
creditors unavailable under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The new act 
expands already existing Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction over unfair 
or deceptive acts and practices of collection agencies; it is not written on a 
clean slate. The Federal Trade Commission's prior exercise of jurisdiction in 
this area is entitled to great weight, U. S. v. Shrevepart Grain & Elevator Co., 
287 U.S. 77, 84, 53 S.Ct. 42, 44, 77 L.Ed. 175, 179 (1932), and leads to the 
conclusion that the new Act merely supplements the [FTC Act]...", (emphasis 
in original.) 
In deciding a case of first impression under the FDCPA, the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming observed that primary enforcement for violations of the Act continued to be 
vested in an aggrieved debtor, as was the case in the Truth in Lending Act, rather than in 
the Federal Trade Commission as before: 
"Administrative enforcement of the FDCPA is assigned to the Federal Trade 
Commission, 15 U.S.C § 1692/, but the primary enforcement, in order to 
eliminate the objectionable practices, is self-enforcement by the aggrieved 
debtor acting as a 'private attorney general' through a civil action like that 
initiated by Johnson. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; Zimmerman, Staub, Riveria; Westv. 
Costen, 558 F.Supp. 564 (W.D.Va., 1983)." Johnson v. Statewide Collections, 
Inc., 778 P.2d 93, 99 (Wyo., 1989). 
See also, Wright v. Collection Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 591,593 (N.D.Ga., 1982) 
("The FDCPA, like many other consumer protection acts, is 'primarily self-enforcing'"); 
McGawan v. King, Inc, 569 F.2d 845,848 (5th Cir., 1976) ("Scheme of Truth in Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., is 'to create a system of private attorneys general to aid its 
enforcement"'); Whatley, etal, v. Universal Collection Bureau, Inc, 525 F.Supp. 1204,1206 
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(N.D.Ga., 1981) ("...Congress created a piece of consumer protection legislation with a 
'private attorneys general1 enforcement mechanism,..."). 
In reaching its determinations in Johnson, supra, the Wyoming Supreme Court had 
previously considered as follows: 
"We must then consider the merits of the several asserted grounds for 
recovery under the FDCPA. Congress adopted this legislation in 1977 to 
protect consumers from abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection 
activities by eliminating certain offensive and unethical practices in vogue 
with many third-party debt collectors. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 
834 F.2d 1163 (3rd Cir., 1987); Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 62 A.L.RFed. 544 
(3rd Cir., 1980); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y., 
1988). ... The objectionable practices, still prevalent even after the adoption 
of the FDCPA, often are exacerbated because independent collectors generally 
are unconcerned with the consumer's opinion of them, or their own 
reputations in the eyes of the public, and they proceed accordingly. ... 
Because the goal of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive collection practices it 
is applicable whether or not a valid debt exists. Baker v. G. C. Services Corp., 
677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir., 1982). ... Standing is afforded an aggrieved consumer 
to proceed under the act as long as the collector was purporting to attempt 
to collect an alleged debt In a report from the subcommittee, its chairman 
said, 'every individual, whether or not he owes the debt, has the right to be 
treated in a reasonable and civil manner.' 123 Cong.Rec. 10241 (1977); Baker, 
677 F.2d at 777 r Johnson, supra, 77S P.2d at 98-99. (emphasis added.) 
Another provision of the FDCPA that is particularly relevant to the instant case on 
appeal is that set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) which provides: 
"(b) Disputed debts. If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 
within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the 
debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the 
name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector SHALL cease 
collection of the debt, or any disputed portion tfiereof UNTIL the debt 
collector obtains verification of the debtor a copy of a judgment, or the name 
and address of the original creditor, and a COPY of such verification or 
judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, IS MAILED TO THE 
CONSUMER BY THE DEBT COLLECTOR." (Emphasis added.) 
This provision of the FDCPA requires the verification, or validation, of the alleged 
debt in order to prevent collection activities from being directed against the wrong person 
or against a debtor who has paid. Johnson, supra, 77% P.2d at 100; Swanson, supra, 869 
F.2d at 1225; Staubf supra, 626 F.2d at 277; Riveria, supra, 682 F.Supp. 174. In the instant 
case, Plaintiff submitted to Defendant its initial communication (hereinafter "Initial 
Communication"), dated 8 May 1991, in connection with its assignment of the alleged debt, 
seeking a "Total Due" of $4,126.64.25 By return letter, dated 15 May 1991, Defendant duly 
notified Plaintiff of three specific items: (1) that the debt was disputed; (2) that verification 
of the debt was requested; and (3) to cease communications except for providing the 
requested verification.26 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). Plaintiff, however, persisted in mailing to 
Defendant dunning notices of varying amounts27 and engaging in telephone harassment 
of Defendant throughout 1991, notwithstanding its admitted acknowldegment of the 
contents of Defendant's 15 May 1991 letter to cease and desist,28 each of which 
communications thereafter constituted a separate violation of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 
1692c(c); Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 591, 594 (N.D.Ga., 1982). 
That was harassment 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5); Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 
864, 873 (D.N.D., 1981). Nevertheless, on or about 27 July 1992, Plaintiff filed the action 
now on appeal here seeking $3,976.64. One month later, on or about 27 August 1992, 
Plaintiffs Assignor also mailed to Defendant a dunning notice seeking $5,162.77,29 
notwithstanding the amount sought in Plaintiffs complaint and further notwithstanding 
25
 See Defendant's Counterclaim, "Exhibit A." 
26
 "Exhibit B." Ibid. See also Record Transcript, p. 11, lines 1-5, and paragraphs 24-25 
of Defendant's counterclaim (p. 12). 
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 See Counterclaim Exhibits "C-l," "C-2," "D-l," "D-2," "D-3" and "E." See also, R.T., 
p. 94, lines 2-5: "Mr. Mulliner: And we admit we sent those documents. We deny that 
those documents in any way violate the Act and I take it that that's your ruling, that they 
don't violate the Act." 
28
 See Plaintiffs Answers to Request For Admissions (2nd Set) and Production of 
Documents, dated 25 October 1994, request #68. 
29
 See Counterclaim Exhibit "J." At trial, Plaintiff, noting the obvious incorrectness of 
this amount, stated: "There are some numbers that will have to be backed out." (R.T., p. 
24, lines 9-17.) 
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its assignment of the alleged debt to Plaintiff some sixteen (16) months earlier.30 On or 
about 23 November 1992, Defendant mailed to Plaintiff, this time by certified mail, a 
second cease and desist letter again notifying Plaintiff inter alia to cease all attempts to 
collect the alleged debt and to withdraw its filed action.31 Although Plaintiff admitted on 
discovery that it acknowledged the plain language contained in Defendant's notice of 15 
May 1991, Plaintiff nevertheless failed to comply with Defendant's request which was duly 
made within the statutory 30-day period. Plaintiff, however, denied such failure,32 but 
offered no proof to the contrary, nor is there any evidentiary support in the record other 
than Plaintiffs naked denial in this material respect. In light of Plaintiffs acknowledgment 
of the subject matter of Defendant's 15 May 1991 letter, as published in the record, and the 
court having been so advised at trial,33 it was clear error for the court thereafter to find 
that Defendant had failed to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence" that she had a 
cause of action under the FDCPA and, subsequently, the UCSPA. Sorenson v. Kennecott-
Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,1147 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994) (findings are clearly erroneous 
if they are against clear weight of evidence or if appellate court reaches definite and firm 
conviction that mistake has been made). Moreover, to the extent the record fails to reflect 
any evidence whatsoever that Plaintiff complied with Defendant's written request for 
verification of the alleged debt, under § 1692g(b) Plaintiff was statutorily barred from 
further attempts to pxirsue collection thereof upon and after its receipt of Defendant's 15 
3 0
 Counsel stated assignment occurred on 25 April 1991. (R.T., p. 22, lines 17-18.) 
Exhibit A, however, affixed the alleged amount due as of 8 May 1991 at $4,126.64. 
31
 See Counterclaim Exhibits "H" and "I." 
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 See Plaintiffs Answers to Request For Admissions (2nd Set) and Production of 
Documents, Ibid., #69. 
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 See R.T., p. 11, lines 1-5. 
May 1991 letter until such time as it complied with the provisions of the statute owing to 
the use of the mandatory form of the word "shall." See Johnson, supra, 778 P.2d at 100, 
where the Wyoming Supreme court makes this point crystal clear: 
"It was CheckRite's duty, under the statute, to cease collection activities on 
the date it received the letter from Johnson's counsel until it sent Johnson, 
through his counsel, verification of the alleged debt. Staub. The 
congressional intent is plain and no other meaning can possibly be imposed 
for this portion of the statute. [ ] The mandatory form of the word 'shall* is 
used in the statute. ... Federal precedent suggests that fin construing a statute 
we are obliged to give effect, * * *, to every word Congress used.' Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979); 
Baker, 677 F.2d at 778. Application of that concept to this statute manifests 
an implicit requirement that the verification furnished from the creditor be 
in writing because the statute also requires that a copy of the verification be 
mailed to the consumer. (Wyo. cites omitted.) With that implicit 
requirement, an oral validation of a debt is not sufficient to comply with the 
FDCPA." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, not even an oral validation of the alleged debt was provided to 
Defendant by Plaintiff, much less in writing as the statute commands. Only on 28 October 
1994, or nearly 3-1/2 years after its acknowledgment of Defendant's 15 May 1991 request, 
and then only after being compelled through discovery, did Plaintiff provide to Defendant 
copies of dociunents purporting to be "verification" of the alleged debt — the conflicting 
amounts notwithstanding. Where the record reflects that such documents were included 
in the original assignment to Plaintiff on or about 25 April 1991, Plaintiffs failure to 
comply with Defendant's request was done knowingly and wilfully, and with intentional 
disregard of this mandatory duty.34 
3 4
 Exhibit A makes specific reference to this provision of the FDCPA where the second 
paragraph states: 
"Public Law 95-109, Section 809 [15 U.S.C. §1692g] requires you to be 
notified that unless the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof referred 
to by this letter is disputed within thirty days of receipt of this notice, this 
debt is assumed to be valid. If you notify" the AUDIT & ACCOUNTING 
AUTHORITY in writing within thirty days that this debt, or any portion 
thereof, is disputed we will provide you with verification of the debt or 
judgment." 
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More importantly, however, where Plaintiffs failure to comply with the plain 
mandate of the statute absolutely prohibited its further collection attempts until compliance 
was met, it necessarily follows that such prohibition, likewise, precluded Plaintiffs standing 
to sue in this case, as Plaintiffs action cannot be reasonably construed as anything other 
than an illegal attempt to enforce prohibited collection in light of the admitted facts. 
Standing, being jurisdictional in nature, must be proven when challenged and may be 
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. The facts and admissions in this 
case clearly establish the want of jurisdiction on the grounds just shown and the same is, 
therefore, fatal to Plaintiffs case. Accordingly, the judgment is required to be vacated as 
void, as a matter of law. 
Notwithstanding this fatal jurisdictional defect and bar against Plaintiffs further 
collection attempts, Defendant's counterclaim exhibits conclusively prove that Plaintiff 
continued to engage in proscribed communications with Defendant thereafter by both mail 
and telephone, each of which incidents constituted a separate violation of the FDCPA. 
Wright supra, 548 F.Supp. 591, 594; Bingham, supra, 505 F.Supp. 864, 871-874. In the 
pubHshed exhibits, and at trial, Plaintiff admitted mailing such documents, although it also 
denied that such mailings violated the Act. (See footnote #27, ante., p. 38.) Plaintiff failed, 
however, to offer any proof in support of this bare, conclusory assertion, offering only as 
follows: 
"We deny that those documents in any way violate the Act and I take it that 
that's your ruling, that they don't violate the Act." Ibid. 
Being persuaded by this naked assertion notwithstanding Defendant's evidence to the 
contrary, the court, without more, ruled against Defendant nevertheless. 
Plaintiffs Initial Communication also violated the FDCPA in a number of other 
significant ways. First, Defendant's counterclaim alleged that Exhibit A constituted a false 
or misleading representation in that it contained the both the name "Audit & Accounting 
Authority, Ltd., and the name and logo of "ATTORNEYS Credit Service" as the most 
predominant visual effect on the form, thus misleading Defendant, as "the least 
sophisticated consumer," into believing that Plaintiffs communication involved attorneys 
in some respect.35 Plaintiff also denied this allegation, albeit in circuitous fashion: 
"Mr. Mulliner: WeVe admitted mailing certain documents, that's correct, 
Your Honor. We deny that they say to use a name, which isn't registered 
with the state, by the way, licensed, bonded, Attorneys Credit Services 
misleads anybody into thinking that a letter is from an attorney when it 
doesn't purport to be signed by an attorney, doesn't have an attorney's 
letterhead or anything like that." (R. T., p. 88, lines 10-16.) 
While Plaintiffs argument here does much to establish its cognizance that debt 
collection is a regulated industry; that Plaintiff is an entity organized and existing under 
the laws of this State; and that it is engaged in the business of collecting debts, under 
assignment, from creditors36 - all of which clearly subjects Plaintiff to the provisions of the 
Act — nevertheless, its bare, unsupported denial fails to establish any proof how it's forms 
are not misleading to "the least sophisticated consumer" in light of the decisional law under 
the Act conclusively establishing such violations. Accordingly, to the extent this 
predominant wording appearing on the face of the form tended to mislead Defendant into 
believing that attorneys were somehow involved, this practice is soundly proscribed by the 
FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), (13). See Johnson, 778 P.2d at 103: 
"As the statute has been applied, even though a debt collector uses its true 
name, that name still may violate the FDCPA if it has a likelihood of 
deceiving or misleading the consumer. Wright 548 F.Supp. 591. The use of 
a name, even though truly and appropriately belonging to the collector, that 
either states or implies that the collector is something that in fact it is not is 
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 See Defendant's Counterclaim, para. 28, p. 13. 
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 See State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d at 524-25; Wright v. Collection 
Bureau of Georgia, Inc. 548 F.Supp. at 900; Riveria, 682 F.Supp. at 176; Johnson, 77S P.2d 
at 103. Ibid. 
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a clear violation of the spirit of the statute even though arguably within the 
letter of the law. If the name would cause the least sophisticated consumer' 
to erroneously believe that the entity was a governmental agency or a law 
office, the use of the name could violate this provision even though it was the 
correct name for the debt collector.1' 
Also see Bingham, 505 F.Supp. at 870; Wright v. Collection Bureau of Georgia, Inc, 548 
F.Supp. at 600 [9]. In Wright the court stated: 
"Since the appropriate standard is an objective one, the tendency of the 
defendants1 statements to deceive is not determined by the fact that Ms. 
Wright may have been deceived into thinking that she was dealing directly 
with a consumer reporting agency. Rather, the court must determine for 
itself whether an unsophisticated consumer on the low side of reasonable 
capacity1 would have been deceived. Applying that standard, the court holds 
that the letters sent by CBI to Ms. Wright violated section 1692e)." 
Concurring with the rationale expressed in Wright and other federal cases, the opinion 
rendered in Johnson, supra, sheds further light and instruction on this point: 
"Perhaps Johnson was perceptive enough not to be deceived by this notice, 
but CheckRite's argument demonstrates a type of abuse sought to be 
eliminated by the FDCPA. Furthermore, its contention ignores the rule that 
this act is to be construed to the benefit of the least sophisticated debtor.1 
Swanson, 869 F.2d 1222; Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc, 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Or., 
1985); Kimberv. Federal Finance Corporation, 668 F.Supp. 1480 (M.D.Ala., 
1987). See Baker, 677 F.Supp. 370; Wright [supra], Checkrite's argument with 
respect to the impact upon Johnson is not material, and CheckRite has not 
chosen to address the impact of its notice upon the least sophisticated of 
debtors. To avoid this precise dilemma, Congress wisely chose to require 
debt collectors to regulate themselves by the maintenance of procedures 
adapted to avoid such errors as that demonstrated in this case." Johnson v. 
Statewide Collections, Inc, 778 P.2d at 102. 
At trial, however, the court wholly misconstrued Defendant's attempt to show how 
Plaintiffs forms tended to be misleading and violative of the Act where, without more, it 
summarily dismissed the matter by concluding as follows: 
"The ones that I have dealt with sanctions and things involving people who 
represent themselves to be attorneys who want to be, that sort of thing. If 
the letter was signed by a Mr. John Jones, attorney at law, I mean that's not -
-". (R.T., p. 88, lines 17-21.) 
Secondly, Plaintiffs Initial Communication further violated the FDCPA where, 
although it contained a provision notifying Defendant of the thirty-day period in which to 
request verification of the alleged debt, that notification is misleading where it also specifies 
not only one, but two (2) additional conflicting time provisions in which to pay the alleged 
debt: (i) "...[m]ust now be paid upon receipt of this notice," and (ii) "You must remit 
payment to this office within seven (7) days...". Courts deciding this particular issue have 
consistently found that such conflict in terms does not effectively communicate to "the least 
sophisticated consumer" the statutory right to thirty days in which to request verification 
of an alleged debt. Ostv. Collection Bureau, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 701,702 (D.N.D., 1980) ("The 
'communication1 to the consumer, therefore, is that he has five days in which to pay the 
alleged debt or face some further 'proceeding' by the debt collector. Since the Act 
specifically gives the consumer thirty days in which to dispute the validity of that debt, the 
language on the front of Collection Bureau, Inc.'s form is, at best, misleading"); Riveria, 682 
F.Supp. at 177; Genusov. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 443 (3rd Cir., 1977) 
(disclosure of terms shall not be stated, utilized, or placed so as to mislead or confuse 
consumers; placement of disclosures is to be considered along with their statement and 
use); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3rd Cir., 1991) (notice of right to respond 
within thirty days is not effectively communicated when presented in conjunction with 
contradictory demand for payment within ten days); see also, Swanson, supra, 869 F.2d at 
1225 (9th Cir., 1988) (same). Plaintiffs Initial Communication was thus further violative 
of the Act. 
In sum, the documentary evidence published in this case clearly shows that Plaintiff 
violated the provisions of the FDCPA in numerous ways. As the court was bound to take 
judicial notice of the statute, due process was thus violated in several respects, including, 
but not limited to: (i) relying upon Plaintiffs naked assertions in ruling that Plaintiffs 
actions "don't violate the Act;" (ii) by refusing to refer to Defendant's counterclaim and 
exhibits during trial; (iii) by having Defendant's Counsel "...[jjust give me a Reader's Digest 
[version]" of the acts alleged to be violative of the FDCPA, rather than being permitted to 
call witnesses to be directly examined on these issues; (iv) by declaring as "res judicata" a 
further violative communication sent by Plaintiff to Defendant only after trial had been set 
in this matter and holding the same not to be a part of Defendant's counterclaim, 
notwithstanding the court's prior acknowledgment of Defendant's letter of 15 May 1991 
advising Plaintiff to cease communications; and (v) ultimately accepting Plaintiffs 
conclusory "findings of facts" in these respects as constituting a "preponderance of the 
evidence" that Defendant had failed to establish that she had a cause of action under the 
FDCPA and the UCSPA. Thus, Defendant was deprived of due process as the proximate 
result of the court's fundamental misconception of the nature and purpose of the FDCPA. 
Federal precedent is equally instructive in clarifying errors such as these. In dealing with 
"initial communication" violations such as the one at issue here, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in holding such notice as violative of the Act, critically reviewed the actions 
of a federal magistrate and the district court in these terms: 
"The magistrate, whose findings were adopted without revision or comment 
by the district court, termed Swanson's argument 'frivilous,' concluding that 
'[njothing in the notice can reasonably be construed as threatening [Swanson] 
with adverse consequences.' This conclusion is patently at odds with the 
tenor and text of the notice itself. The reference to the undefined 'master file,' 
juxtaposed with the admonition that Swanson's credit rating was his 'most 
valuable asset,' cannot reasonably be interpreted as anything but a threat: if 
Swanson did not pay within 10 days, his name would be placed in Southern 
Oregon's 'master file' and as a result he would lose his 'most valuable asset.' 
"The magistrate's conclusion demonstrates a fundamental misconception of 
the nature of section 1692g. The statute is not satisfied merely by inclusion 
of the required debt validation notice; the notice Congress required must be 
conveyed effectively to the debtor. ... Furthermore, to be effective, the notice 
must not be overshadowed or contradicted by other messages or notices 
appearing in the initial communication from the collection agency. E,g,, 
Thomas v. National Business Assistants, Inc., No. N82-469 (D.Conn., Oct. 5, 
1984) ('inconspicuous and grossly overshadowed' notice did 'not properly 
notify recipients of their validation of debt rights') (cites omitted)." Swanson 
v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d at 1225 (9th Cir., 1988). 
The "fundamental misconception" syndrome was similarly demonstrated by the trial 
court in this case where it had also stated: 
"...[b]ut there's nothing in here that jumps up and down and says that your 
client was misled or made some payments or was browbeaten to do anything. 
She certainly wasn't browbeaten into anything,..." (R.T., p. 93, lines 17-20.) 
Thus the court completely misconstrued its adjudicative duty so clearly pointed out in 
Johnson, supra, that "...[t]he court must determine for itself whether an unsophisticated 
consumer on the low side of reasonable capacity* would have been deceived," rather than 
simply finding, without more, that "nothing" in Defendant's counterclaim "jumps up and 
down and says that" Defendant was "misled... or was browbeaten into anything." Indeed, 
Defendant's counterclaim does not say that. Rather, it clearly alleges, fully supported by 
documentary evidence, numerous violations of the Act committed by Plaintiff during the 
pendency of this action that courts, both federal and state, trial and appellate, have 
repeatedly and consistently held to be violations over the past eighteen years since the Act 
was passed. Even the envelopes Plaintiff used to communicate with Defendant by use of 
the mails were violative of the Act where they facially demonstrate "symbols" and language 
other than Plaintiff s address. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). In deciding just such a case the South 
Carolina Court of Appeals, in reversing a summary judgment, cited this provision of the 
FDCPA and stated: 
"An unfair practice includes the use of 'any language or symbol, other than 
the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a 
consumer by use of the mails ..., except that a debt collector may use his 
business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection 
business." Phillips v. Periodical Publishers1 Service Bureau, Inc., supra, 369 
S.E.2d 154, 156 (S.C.App., 1988). 
On this point during trial, the following brief discussion ensued wherein Plaintiff clearly 
acknowledged that it is in the collection business, as evidenced by the symbol and 
language on it's mailing envelopes clearly stating ATTORNEYS CREDIT SERVICE: 
R c i r r ric- A p p n I AKJT - p A r i r ZL& 
"Mr. Stanton: Alleging or giving the innuendo that they are collecting for 
attorneys or that they are attorneys. 
Mr. Mulliner: Put it back. They do collect for attorneys and I don't think 
that represents that they are attorneys." (R.T., p. 88, lines 12-16.) 
In this regard the court, again, demonstrated its fundamental misconception of the Act 
where it stated as follows: 
"And looking at some egregious sort of behavior with respect to agencies 
and maybe I've become desensitized because maybe, you know, having on 
your letterhead if it says Attorneys' Service or something, maybe I'm not 
reading it correctly, Mr. Stanton, but I am reading that they're providing a 
service to interpret Attorney's Credit Service. I don't read that as being 
threatening toward Billie Murdock or saying that we have big shot lawyers 
who are going to sue you when they really don't." (R.T., pp. 91-91, lines 22-
25 and 1-5, respectively.) 
But, as was held in Johnson and Wright supras, the court is not charged with the duty to 
"read that as being threatening," rather, the court must determine for itself whether an 
unsophisticated consumer on the 'low side of reasonable capacity," would have been 
deceived by the symbol and language on Plaintiffs envelopes as well as the contents 
thereof — even if it is Plaintiffs correct name. 
Moreover, under the FDCPA statutory damages are available merely on proof of a 
violation, as no proof of actual damages need be established. Such was stated by the Ninth 
Circuit in Baker as follows: 
"Further, the Act's damage provisions are very similar to those under the 
Truth in Lending Act (ULA), 15 U.S.C § 1640(a). Under TILA, statutory 
damages are available merely on proof of a violation; no proof of actual 
damages is required. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 
356,376-77,93 S.Ct. 1652,1664-65,36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Dzadauskuv. Lyons 
Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538 539, (3rd Cir., 1979); Gennuso v. Commercial 
Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 443 (3rd Cir., 1977)." Cf, Baker v. G. C. 
Services Corp., 677 F.2d 778, 780 [11] (9th Cir., 1982). 
In sum, each and every contact Plaintiff made with Defendant after 15 May 1991 
constituted a violation of the Act as the proximate result of its failure to abide by the 
provisions thereof where Defendant, as the 'least sophisticated consumer" acting as a 
"private attorney general," had exercised her statutory right to request that Plaintiff cease 
further communications except to provide her with verification of the alleged debt, which 
Plaintiff clearly did not do; nor could it in light of the aftermath of trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed herein, the judgment rendered as against Defendant 
should be reversed with an award of costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of September, 1995. 
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